At the start of the 21st century, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) seems to have great potential for innovating business practices with a positive impact on People, Planet and Profit. In this article the differences between the management systems approach of the nineties, and Corporate Social Responsibility are analysed.An analysis is structured around three business principles that are relevant for CSR and management systems: (1) doing things right the first time, (2) doing the right things, and (3) continuous improvement and innovation. (...) Basically CSR is focussing on the second principle, and management systems focus on the first. However, CSR is very likely to build on the management systems as well.From a CSR point of view, the existing generation of management systems with their focus on rational control (= doing things right) can only be of limited use in the development of CSR. However, the preventive rationalities of management systems are important. Values and the principle doing the right things is extremely relevant for CSR. This goes far beyond the present generation of ISO type management systems; opportunities stem from building on TQM approaches like the EFQM Business Excellence model. Continuous improvement and innovation is a permanent challenge underlying the two other business principles, and requires both individual and organisational learning processes. In the present generation of management systems, continuous improvement mainly addresses rational prevention, barely the value aspects of business.For the further development and implementation of CSR, each of the three business management principles are vital. There is a need for a new generation of management systems that addresses the values at stake in strategic decision-making, both at company level and in the behaviour of individuals, while the rationalities of prevention and anticipation are still relevant. In both directions more emphasis for continuous learning and innovation will be needed.CSR is likely to trigger the development of management systems in the directions mentioned. This will support companies to be credible and transparent in improving the performance with respect to people, planet and profit. (shrink)

"Desartización", es el término acuñado por T.W. Adorno a fines de los años 50 para referirse al proceso dialéctico por el que el arte va perdiendo progresivamente sus cualidades y rasgos tradicionales -la autonomía que mantuvo desde Diderot a Kant, Schiller y Hegel- para convertirse en otra cosa: en producto de la industria cultural, en víctima de las fuerzas ideológicas que dominan la sociedad administrada y en mera mercancía, es decir, en un producto cosificado que deja de ser un modo (...) esencial de pensar el mundo. El autor entiende el "arte sin fin" como arte sin finalidad, objeto o función, en oposición a las doctrinas ilustradas y románticas, e intenta dar una explicación de la lógica conceptual que rige su planteamiento y su conexión con la evolución cultural. (shrink)

The differentiation of mammalian neurons during development is a highly complex process involving regulation and coordination of gene expression at multiple steps. The P19 mouse embryonal carcinoma cell line is a suitable model system with which to analyze regulation of neuronal differentiation. These multipotential cells can be maintained and propagated in tissue culture in an undifferentiated state. Exposure of aggregated P19 cells to retinoic acid results in the differentiation of cells with many fundamental phenotypes of mammalian neurons. Undifferentiated P19 cells (...) are amenable to genetic manipulations such as transfection and establishment of stable clonal cell lines expressing introduced genes. Proteins that play a key role in the neuronal differentiation of P19 cells are beginning to be identified. These include retinoic acid receptors, the epidermal growth factor receptor and the transcription factors Oct‐3 and Brn‐2. The biological and technical advantages of this system should facilitate deeper analysis of the activities of proteins that play a role in neuronal differentiation. (shrink)

This paper identifies the key assumptions underpinning current arrangements in vocational education and training (VET) in the UK. These assumptions, and the idea of vocational capability they denote, are rejected in favour of a more coherent conception—a conception centred not on the traditional dichotomy of ‘knowing how-knowing that’ but on what I refer to as the ‘constitutive understandings’ from which both practical and theoretical capabilities can be seen to derive. It is argued that an account of vocational capability in these (...) terms suggests a far richer conception of vocational preparation than current arrangements are able to admit. (shrink)

This the first part of a study (in two parts) devoted to Piketty’s theses on the history of capitalism. A summary of Pikety’s analysis is first presented, concerning the dynamics of total wealth (measured as a ratio to national income) and its components, and the tendency of wealth and income inequalities within major capitalist countries. The amplitude of the fall of total wealth in the United-Kingdom and France during World War I is questioned. Piketty explains the profile of these variables (...) concerning wealth and wealth inequalities in reference to historical mechanisms in which the rate of growth of output, the rate of savings, and the return on wealth are considered. The relevance of these mechanisms is basically questioned. We interpret the third component of wealth, other domestic capital, as a form of the capital of enterprises and substitute an alternative, more performing, model to account for the profile of this variable. (shrink)

Kelly, Gerard There has always been a tension between the justice and the mercy of God. The two seem very uneasy companions. In the mind of some, justice and mercy are mutually exclusive. This, then, plays out in society and the way we practise justice. From my point of view, as a theologian, there is a genuine theological question here and it concerns how we understand God, and as a consequence how we understand the relationship between justice and mercy. (...) On the one hand, the traditional metaphysical starting point for the doctrine of God leaves little room for the mercy of God since God as perfect Being cannot suffer-to suffer would be a deficiency.1 On the other hand, there is a strong tradition, particularly since the Reformation, of the justice of God, where justice is an expression of the mercy of God. Yet this tradition struggles today to have an impact on religious consciousness. The theological question also has implications for the wider society. If Western society is no longer being shaped by the Christian faith, then the meaning of both mercy and justice may undergo change in such a way that they become incompatible. I will explore this question by referring to three articles that have appeared in popular journalism. This will lead me to a theological examination of mercy and justice. (shrink)

Are OCypersonsOCO physical things, members of the species homo sapiens which exist solely in materialist form, continuous in structure with other living things? Or is the issue a more complex one: are there more dimensions to being a person than mere physical, biological existence? These are matters of interest and discussion in many fields of study in this age of individuality. In this wide-ranging essay, the author addresses various aspects of the issue, including the history of self and identity. The (...) ancient tradition of dualism is rejected in favour of a straightforward holistic and naturalistic account of selfhood; it is argued that the mind arises in an emergent sense from the body and personal identity is best expressed in terms of a self-reflective and meaningful narrative. The approach is principally from an analytic philosophy point of view but also takes onOCoboard psychological and sociological aspects of self and identity. (shrink)

I survey some important semantical and axiomatic theories of self-referential truth. Kripke's fixed-point theory, the revision theory of truth and appraoches involving fuzzy logic are the main examples of semantical theories. I look at axiomatic theories devised by Cantini, Feferman, Freidman and Sheard. Finally some applications of the theory of self-referential truth are considered.

Trolley problems and like cases are often thought to show the inadequacy of purely consequentialist moral theories. In particular, they are often taken to reveal that consequentialists unduly neglect the moral significance of the causal structure of decision problems. To precisify such critiques and one sort of deontological morality they motivate, I develop a formal modeling framework within which trolley problems can be represented as suitably supplemented structural causal models and various consequentialist and double effect-inspired moral theories can be viewed (...) as disagreeing over the inputs of a common decision rule. (shrink)

After providing a novel taxonomy of lottery procedures for fairly distributing scarce goods, I defend a new weighted lottery theory. This taxonomy is necessary because the debate between unweighted and weighted lottery theorists overlooks a range of cases, overlap cases, in which conducting an unweighted lottery is impossible or implausible. Therefore, to account for all such cases, lottery theorists must adopt a weighted lottery. However, while no extant weighted lottery is adequate in overlap cases, my new weighted lottery theory is. (...) I conclude by discussing my theory’s practical implications. (shrink)

Simulation relations have been discovered in many areas: Computer Science, philosophical and modal logic, and set theory. However, the simulation condition is strictly a first-order logic statement. We extend modal logic with modalities and axioms, the latter’s modeling conditions are the simulation conditions. The modalities are normal, i.e., commute with either conjunctions or disjunctions and preserve either Truth or Falsity (respectively). The simulations are considered arrows in a category where the objects are descriptive, general frames. One can augment the simulation (...) modalities by axioms for requiring the underlying modeling simulations to be bisimulations or to be p-morphisms. The modal systems presented are multi-sorted and both sound and complete with respect to their algebraic and Kripke semantics. (shrink)

Building on the literature about the important differences between philosophical theory development and policymaking (Kamm 1990), I argue that the role and implications of counterexamples differ si...

It has become widely recognized that religiousness has a predictable pattern of small associations with Big Five personality dimensions, and has some intersections with cultural psychology. But just how large are those culture-religiosity intersections, and are there additional associations with personality when one extends beyond the restricted spectrum represented by Big Five traits? Moreover, do the answers to these questions depend on how religiousness is defined and measured? I argue that, both conceptually and empirically, religiousness itself meets the criteria for (...) a personality dimension (including stability, heritability, and other grounds), and is simultaneously for the most part a cultural phenomenon reflecting often widely shared sets of beliefs, values, worldviews, and norms. The patterns of modest associations with other personality dimensions, from the Big Five and beyond, are consistent with both arguments. A distributive model of culture, under which culture is aggregated personalities (and especially mindsets) helps make sense of these relations. Tradition-oriented religiousness tends to have a prominent position in enduring-order (as contrasted with evolving-order) cultures, which helps account for its occasional expressions in political religion. In contrast, mystical spirituality is more prone to manifest as a sub-cultural phenomenon peripheral to mainstream culture. But for either conception—religiousness or spirituality—the same personality-and-culture propositions appear to hold. Nonetheless, religiousness seems not totally reducible to a variable for personality or cultural psychology, and considerations are introduced regarding what that irreducible element is most likely to be. (shrink)

A necessary refinement of the concept of circular reasoning is applied to the self-and-universally-referential inductive justification of induction. It is noted that the assumption necessary for the circular proof of a principle of induction is that one inference is valid, not that the entire principle or rule of induction governing that inference is true. The circularity in an ideal case is demonstrated to have a value of lin where n represents the number of inferences asserted valid by the conclusion of (...) the justifying argument, and the ‘I’ represents the inference necessarily assumed valid.An induction antinomy modeled after Russell’s antinomy of the set of all and only non-self-containing sets is derived. Isomorphic antinomies are noted to be derivable for other arguments of philosophical interest, including those purported to undermine theories of determinism, relativism, and skepticism, and including the one that Descartes reduced and converted to ‘Cogito, ergo sum’. (shrink)

This article offers a new theory about how using lotteries to distribute scarce benefits satisfies beneficiaries' claims. In the first section of the article I criticize John Broome's view and on the basis of these criticisms set out four desiderata for a philosophically adequate account of claim satisfaction by lottery. In section II I propose and defend a new view called the dual structure view, so called because it posits that claimants have two types of claims in the relevant scarce (...) benefit distribution cases under discussion. This view meets all the desiderata set out in section I. Section III draws out the practical implications of my view for a variety of temporally extended cases, including the distribution of corneas to patients who have suffered corneal degeneration. (shrink)

Before I come to Professor Anderson’s objections to the argument in question, I should like to clarify just a few points. The argument that I presented is taken immediately from Mortimer Adler’s presentation of it, so let us call it ‘Adler’s Argument,’ though in fact its origins go all the way back to Aristotle. My reading of Adler’s presentation of the argument was that he gave it in two different forms, one categorical, the other hypothetical. Both forms of the argument, (...) of course, have effectively the same conclusion, which is, in the case of its categorical version, that “concepts are not physical beings” [proposition 3 for Professor Anderson] and, in the case of its hypothetical version, that “A concept is not an act of a bodily organ” [proposition 6 for Professor Anderson]. Now Adler concludes immediately from propositions 3/6 that “the power of conceptual thought is an immaterial power.” I argued in my original article that it was not obvious that this proposition was equivalent to propositions 3/6 and so I presented an additional argument to the bridge the gap [propositions a, b, c and d for Professor Anderson]. Let us call this ‘Casey’s Addendum.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN EXPLICATION OF THE DE HEBDOMADIBUS OF BOETHIUS IN THE LlGHT OF ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY HE WRITINGS o:f Ancius Manlius Severinus Boehius exercised a powerful influence on the nature and evelopment o:f mediaeval philosophy. The extent of his influence was such that I think it fair to say that anyone seeking more than a superficial grasp of mediaeval philosophy must acquire some first-hand knowledge of his work. The trouble (...) is, however, that while The Corwlsation of Philosophy is well-known and much commented upon, Boethius's other works are relatively neglected.1 Included in this latter group are the five theological tractates, one of which has this imposing title: Quomodo Substantiae In Eo Quad Sint Bonae Sint Cum Non Sint Substantialia Bona. This tractate also has the more managable title De Hebdomadibus and it is as such that I shall refer to it throughout this article.2 I have chosen to give an explication of the De Hebdomadibus for three reasons. First the problem with which it deals (the nature of the relation between goodness and substance) is intrinsically interesting and Boethius's solution to the problem is a model of philosophical analysis. Second, in addition to the fact that the philosophical status of the nine axioms listed in the tractate is a matter of some scholarly controversy, the answer to the obvious question of how these axioms function in the tractate as a whole is not at all clear. And third, this tractate is philosophically significant to those philosophers who take St. 1 I am obliged to Professor Ralph Mcinerny for awakening my interest in Boethius and for his suggestion that the De Hebdomadibus would repay careful study. 2 All references are to the H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand edition of The Theological Traotates and The Consolation of Philosophy, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973). 419 420 GERARD CASEY Thomas as their inspiration since it appears that St. Thomas's existence/essence distinction is adumbrated here. I shall begin my explication by giving a brief overview of the main lines of the tractate. Then I shall lay out the arguments contained in the statement and resolution of the dilemma which Boethius constructs, indicating (by means of Roman numerals in parentheses ) where I think particular axioms are meant to apply. Finally, I shall display the axioms as perspicuously as possible and comment on them. Overview The groundplan of the De Hebdomadibus is as follows. It begins with a brief introduction which contains the nine axioms. Then the problem to be considered is outlined in the form of the following dilemma. Things which are are good. This is the basic assumption which will generate the dilemma. Things which are good are so either by virtue of their substance or by participation. If they are good by virtue of their substance then, since God is the only substantial good, we arrive at an impious conclusion: we identify creatures with their Creator. lf they are good by participation then we generate a contradiction : things do and do not tend toward the good. Therefore, the conclusion must be that things which are are not good, which manifestly contradicts the basic assumption. Boethius's solution to the dilemma makes use of a thought-experiment. Abstracting from the first good he distinguishes locutions such as ' to be ' from locutions such as ' to be good.' On the basis of this distinction he is led to conclude that goodness is either a property of things or a principle of things. Re-introducing the notion of the first good, he notes that it is good by virtue of its very being. Secondary goods are also good by virtue of their being but only because that being derives from the will of the first good. Boethius cautions us against likening the being of particular things to the being of the first good and concludes the tractate by considering and refuting two objections to his solution. THE DE HEBDOMADIBUS IN THE LIGHT OF ST. THOMAS 421 The theme of the tractate is the problem of how substances can be good in virtue of their being without, at the same time... (shrink)

Plato's attitude toward the poets and poetry has always been a flashpoint of debate, controversy and notoriety, but most scholars have failed to see their central role in the ideal cities of the Republic and the Laws, that is, Callipolis and Magnesia. In this paper, I argue that in neither dialogue does Plato "exile" the poets, but, instead, believes they must, like all citizens, exercise the expertise proper to their profession, allowing them the right to become full-fledged participants in the (...) productive class. Moreover, attention to certain details reveals that Plato harnesses both positive and negative factors in poetry to bring his ideal cities closer to a practical realization. The status of the poet and his craft in this context has rarely to my knowledge been addressed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Deep Mysteries: God, Christ, and Ourselves by Aidan NicholsGerard T. MundyDeep Mysteries: God, Christ, and Ourselves by Aidan Nichols, O.P. (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2020), vii + 133 pp.Basic Catholic teaching declares that God's will must be trusted and that perfect knowledge of all that is resides in the Creator. An implication of this claim is that all of God's work within time and history—in man's linearly conception of (...) time and history—is meaningful. For, as perfect order himself God's work is neither random nor coincidental. God's perfect understanding means that he is able, colloquially speaking, "to connect the dots" perfectly. Thus, the historical particulars of the New Testament events are not random and coincidental, but they connect perfectly within God's plan.In terms of biblical events, then, what are the significances of the time periods during which, and places at which, they occurred? "Why was Jesus born on a particular date, at a particular time, and in a particular manger in Bethlehem? Why was the womb of Mary, Mater Dei, chosen at that exact time, and at that exact place? Why did Jesus stand on that particular mountain and not upon another? There are perfect answers to all of those questions and more, for, as Proverbs declares in this vein: "The LORD has made everything for a purpose" (16:4).In Deep Mysteries: God, Christ, and Ourselves, Father Aidan Nichols, O.P., meditates on questions related to the potential reasons for some of the historical particulars of "the principal Christological mysteries." Fr. Nichols defines the mysteries as these: "the Annunciation, the Nativity, the Baptism, the Transfiguration, the Passion and Death, the Descent into Hell, the Resurrection, the Ascension, Pentecost, and the Second Coming." (41).Attempting to understand how all of the parts of the New Testament fit together perfectly in an historical sense—as God's mind would see it—is a fascinating intellectual endeavor. The primary difference between the innocent inquirer and the vain one, however, is that the former understands that God's reason is infinite and that only the First Mover has the ability to see and to put together all particulars. Thomas Aquinas elucidates the essence of the endeavor to connect the particulars when, in reference to man's ability to understand "the truth of faith," he argues: "Yet it is useful for the human reason to exercise itself in such arguments, however weak they may be, provided only that there be present no presumption to comprehend or to demonstrate. For to be able to see something of the loftiest realities, however thin and weak the sight may be, is... a cause of the greatest joy" [Summa contra gentiles I, ch. 8).Posing the question of what the particulars of history might mean brings immediately another question. As Fr. Nichols asks: "How can the Eternal [End Page 386] and time be conjoined in a phrase, and the truth of such conjoining made credible?" (29). Indeed, if God transcends the man-conceived conception of time, how can man even understand God's movements if man can see time only in linear fashion? Fr. Nichols contends that Christ's "mystery-events are not just historical occurrences that, like all such events, belong to the human past" (31). Rather, argues Fr. Nichols, the mysteries "are permanently able to affect the intended beneficiary of the mysteries: namely, the human race" (31). In other words, contends Fr. Nichols, the mysteries are past, present, and future, in the human conception of time.Attempting "to connect the dots" in Christological historical particulars is a subjective endeavor that requires a great deal of individual deciphering, with reliance especially on the interpretation of perceived symbolism. Fr. Nichols's broad theme-based meditations can provide starting points for further study on more concentrated topics.The most exceptional part of the book is Fr. Nichols's discussion on how Jesus's mysteries exist, simultaneously, in the past, in the present, and in the future. This point is of great significance for both theology and philosophy. For, until the Second Coming, God, not being tied to man's limited experience of time, simultaneously, and... (shrink)

One cannot go far in the reading of St Thomas Aquinas and other medieval writers without coming across a multiplicity of usages of the Latin term for ‘being’ or ‘to be’, esse, such as esse intentionale, esse intelligibile, esse naturale, esse sensibile and so on.3 It is not always easy to appreciate the distinctions which these terms are intended to mark and if one is inclined to scepticism one might indeed suspect that these are distinctions without a difference. However, such (...) a judgment would be both precipitate and incorrect. Even if the distinctions marked by such terms are not immediately perspicuous it is essential, if one wishes to understand and appreciate the thought of the medievals, that one come to understand them. Within the compass of a short paper it will not, of course, be possible to be comprehensive, so I shall investigate the notions of immateriality and intentionality with a view to clarifying their relationship.4 In so doing, I hope some light will be thrown.. (shrink)

In his many and varied writings, St Thomas presents us with both a sophisticated account of human action and a complicated moral theory. In this article, I shall be considering the question of whether St Thomas’s theory of action and his moral theory are mutually consistent. My claim shall be that St Thomas can preserve the ontological unity of human action—but only at the cost of rendering it extremely difficult to evaluate in a manner consistent with his moral theory, or, (...) alternatively, that he can provide a viable ethical analysis of human action—but only at the cost of compromising its ontological unity. In the first section of this article I shall examine St Thomas’s account of a particular kind of moral action, namely lying. Two basic questions concerning the specificity of unicity of human action will emerge from this examination: 1) what makes an act to be a specific moral act?, and 2) what makes a specific moral act to be one act? In the second section of the article I shall attempt to show, by means of a textual examination, that St Thomas does not appear to be able to provide an account of human action that will satisfactorily answer both these basic questions at the same time. (shrink)

Standard canonical quantum mechanics makes much use of operators whose spectra cover the set of real numbers, such as the coordinates of space, or the values of the momenta. Discrete quantum mechanics uses only strictly discrete operators. We show how one can transform systems with pairs of integer-valued, commuting operators $P_i$ and $Q_i$ , to systems with real-valued canonical coordinates $q_i$ and their associated momentum operators $p_i$ . The discrete system could be entirely deterministic while the corresponding (p, q) system (...) could still be typically quantum mechanical. (shrink)

Wishing to contribute to the brief history of title science, I would argue that the difference in terminology between “secondary title” and “subtitle” is too weak for the mind to grasp; and since, as Duchet has noted, the principal feature of his “subtitle” is to contain a more or less explicit generic indication, it would be simpler and more vocative to rebaptize it as such, thereby freeing the term “subtitle” to resume its usual present meaning. Hence these three terms: “title” (...) , “subtitle” , “generic indication” . This is the most complete state of a de facto system in which the only mandatory element, in our present culture, is the first one. Nowadays, we find most frequently incomplete combinations, such as title plus subtitle or title plus generic indication —without counting the really simple titles that are reduced to the single “title” element, without subtitle or generic indication, such as Les Mots or, a little differently, statements such as the following, clearly parodic: Victor Shklovskii, Zoo / Letters not about Love / or The Third Heloise. Gérard Genette is professor of history and theory of literary forms at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. His principal works in French include Figures , Figures II , Figures III , Introduction à l’architexte , Nouveau discours du récit , and, most recently, Seuils . Bernard Crampé is assistant professor of romance languages and literatures at the University of Chicago. His principal work is in the history of rhetoric. (shrink)

The emergence of electronic computers in the last thirty years has given rise to many interesting questions. Many of these questions are technical, relating to a machine’s ability to perform complex operations in a variety of circumstances. While some of these questions are not without philosophical interest, the one question which above all others has stimulated philosophical interest is explicitly non-technical and it can be expressed crudely as follows: Can a machine be said to think and, if so, in what (...) sense? The issue has received much attention in the scholarly journals with articles and arguments appearing in great profusion, some resolutely answering this question in the affirmative, some, equally resolutely, answering this question in the negative, and others manifesting modified rapture. While the ramifications of the question are enormous I believe that the issue at the heart of the matter has gradually emerged from the forest of complications. (shrink)

Classical theories of truth are monistic, since they fundamentally search for the essence of truth. The correspondence theory of truth is the most representative in this regard. There are several difficulties with the essentialist theories of truth, which led to the emergence of several alternatives. The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate three of them: the pragmatic theory of truth, the deflationary theory and the pluralistic approach. I argue for overcoming monism and for accepting pluralism in our understanding (...) of truth. At the same time, I argue – from a wittgensteinian point of view – for abandoning the attempt to build a general philosophical theory of truth. I plead for limiting the philosopher’s role to the clarification of the specific ways in which the concept of truth is used in various forms of life and areas of scientific investigation. Multiple uses of the concept of truth in different thematic areas cannot be synthesized, properly speaking, through a particular philosophical theory. (shrink)

By appealing to the religious imagination Theology can make a distinctive contribution to business ethics. In the first part of the essay I examine what is entailed by appealing to the imagination to reason in ethics: through converging arguments the imagination enables us rationally to interpret reality and to infer obligations. In the following sections I consider the relevance of the religious imagination for business ethics. In the second part I explain the imagination''s use of religious metaphor to establish its (...) theological distinctiveness in ethical inquiry. Then in the final part I illustrate Theology''s contribution to business ethics by studying the imagination''s use of religious metaphor with regard to profit and to third world debt. (shrink)

Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.

Sometimes, it is difficult to know what someone means. Sometimes, it merely appears to be difficult. Consider this masterpiece of philosophical hermeneutics from a P. G. Wodehouse short story: “Jeeves,” I said. “A rummy communication has arrived. From Mr. Glossop.” “Indeed, sir?” “I will read it to you. Handed in at Upper Bleaching. Message runs as follows: ‘When you come tomorrow, bring my football boots. Also, if humanly possible, Irish water-spaniel. Urgent. Regards. Tuppy.’.

In “Rothbard as a philosopher” Edward Feser harshly criticises the philosophical abilities of Murray Rothbard. According to Feser, Rothbard seems unable to produce arguments that don’t commit obvious fallacies or produces arguments that fail to address certain obvious objections. His criticism centres on what he regards as Rothbard’s principal argument for the thesis of self-ownership. In this paper, I attempt to show that Feser’s criticism fails of its purpose and that Rothbard is very far from being the epitome of philosophical (...) ineptitude that Feser takes him to be. (shrink)

On peut être surpris de découvrir dans la réflexion contemporaine un plaidoyer en faveur d’une théorie théologique avancée par certains Pères, qu’on aurait pu croire définitivement disqualifiée et réduite à un vestige archaïque, en raison de son relent mythologique, à savoir la rançon que Dieu aurait payée au démon en échange de notre libération. Cette théorie, déjà fortement contestée à l’époque patristique, vient de trouver un avocat avec René Girard pour qui « les Pères grecs avaient raison de dire que, (...) dans la Croix, Satan est le mystificateur pris au piège de sa mystification. » Le rôle des puissances sataniques avait déjà retenu l’attention de cet auteur dans Le Bouc émissaire, mais c’est dans Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair qu’il s’intéresse à ce thème patristique et tente de lui rendre une légitimité perdue. Derrière le besoin de compléter le point de vue des Pères, on devine un travail de réinterprétation où l’emprunt à la tradition ancienne risque de faire figure de pièce rapportée dans une version originale. Le rapport établi entre la croix avec la violence , tant par les Pères que par R. Girard, invite ainsi à un examen comparé, de manière à dégager la spécificité de deux systèmes de pensée, celui de Girard paraissant se situer à un tout autre niveau d’analyse que le souci simple et élémentaire qui habite les Pères lorsqu’ils recourent au mythe d’une tractation avec le démon afin de préserver Dieu du recours à la violence. It is surprising to find in contemporaneous reflection a plea in favor of a theological theory put forward by certain Fathers. One could have believed that it was definitively disqualified and reduced to an archaic vestige, and this by reason of its mythological bad odor, that is to say, the ransom that God would have paid the demon in exchange for our liberation. This theory, already strongly contested in the Patristic Age, came to find an advocate in René Girard for whom “the Greek Fathers were right to say that, in the cross, Satan is the mystifier caught in the trap of his mystification.” The role of Satanic powers already drew the attention of this author in Le Bouc émissaire [The Scapegoat], but it is in Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair [I Saw Satan Fall Like Lightening] that he takes up this patristic theme and tries to return a lost legitimacy to it. Behind the need to supplement the Church Father’s viewpoint, one suspects a work of reinterpretation, where barrowing from the ancient tradition risks giving the impression of a document retrieved from an original version. The relationship established between the cross and violence , as much by the Fathers as by R. Girard, thus invites us to a comparative examination, so as to clarify the specificity of two systems of thought. That of Girard seems to place itself on a completely different level of analysis than the simple and elementary concern that resides in the Fathers when they appeal to the myth where a deal is made with the devil so as to preserve God from resorting to violence. (shrink)

[Note: Picture of Peirce available] Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs Essays in Comparative Semiotics Gérard Deledalle Peirce’s semiotics and metaphysics compared to the thought of other leading philosophers. "This is essential reading for anyone who wants to find common ground between the best of American semiotics and better-known European theories. Deledalle has done more than anyone else to introduce Peirce to European audiences, and now he sends Peirce home with some new flare."—Nathan Houser, Director, Peirce Edition Project Charles S. (...) Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs examines Peirce’s philosophy and semiotic thought from a European perspective, comparing the American’s unique views with a wide variety of work by thinkers from the ancients to moderns. Parts I and II deal with the philosophical paradigms which are at the root of Peirce’s new theory of signs, pragmatic and social. The main concepts analyzed are those of "sign" and "semiosis" and their respective trichotomies; formally in the case of "sign," in time in the case of semiosis. Part III is devoted to comparing Peirce’s theory of semiotics as a form of logic to the work of other philosophers, including Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, Frege, Philodemus, Lady Welby, Saussure, Morris, Jakobson, and Marshall McLuhan. Part IV compares Peirce’s "scientific metaphysics" with European metaphysics. Gérard Deledalle holds the Doctorate in Philosophy from the Sorbonne. A research scholar at Columbia University and Attaché at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, he has also been Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department of the universities of Tunis, Perpignan, and Libreville. In 1990 he received the Herbert W. Schneider Award "for distinguished contributions to the understanding and development of American philosophy. In 2001, he was appointed vice-president of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Contents Introduction—Peirce Compared: Directions for Use Part I—Semeiotic as Philosophy Peirce’s New Philosophical Paradigms Peirce’s Philosophy of Semeiotic Peirce’s First Pragmatic Papers The Postscriptum of 1893 Part II—Semeiotic as Semiotics Sign: Semiosis and Representamen—Semiosis and Time Sign: The Concept and Its Use—Reading as Translation Part III—Comparative Semiotics Semiotics and Logic: A Reply to Jerzy Pelc Semeiotic and Greek Logic: Peirce and Philodemus Semeiotic and Significs: Peirce and Lady Welby Semeiotic and Semiology: Peirce and Saussure Semeiotic and Semiotics: Peirce and Morris Semeiotic and Linguistics: Peirce and Jakobson Semeiotic and Communication: Peirce and McLuhan Semeiotic and Epistemology: Peirce, Frege, and Wittgenstein Part IV—Comparative Metaphysics Gnoseology—Perceiving and Knowing: Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Gestalttheorie Ontology—Transcendentals "of" or "without" Being: Peirce versus Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas Cosmology—Chaos and Chance within Order and Continuity: Peirce between Plato and Darwin Theology—The Reality of God: Peirce’s Triune God and the Church’s Trinity Conclusion—Peirce: A Lateral View. (shrink)

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The detail with which Aristotle discusses the moral virtues might suggest that he is adopting some version of the theory which in our own day is described as ‘virtue ethics’. I shall argue that his emphasis on the importance of proper character formation does not imply the this rather than actions is the primary focus of ethics. Similarly, it will be argued that Aristotle does not intend to suggest that consideration of the virtues offers a much more promising approach to (...) difficult moral issues than is provided by considering moral principles and their complex inter-relationships. And, though Aristotle does in one passage say that it is moral virtue – and hence emotional response – which makes the end of our actions right, it would be a mistake to think of him as a kind of proto-Humean. Aristotle does find a role for moral principles, for deliberation, and for practical wisdom as an intellectual virtue. At the heart of his account is a subtle and complex relationship between emotion, insight, and reasoning. His view of moral decision making is both more startling and more defensible than one might expect. (shrink)

For the Jena Romantics the idea of a self is always in a process, never fully completed. It develops itself as an acting I that interacts with the world, an ongoing interchange between what I am and what I am not. In order to grasp how the self develops and is educated, this paper compares this idea of the self to Schlegel’s account of irony. Both irony and the I exist as an ongoing process. In this comparison the self is (...) found to be a work of art, which is never what it is since its identity always still has to become completed. (shrink)